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Attorney Error: The Martinez
Miscarriage of Justice Solution
Competition between the forces of justice and finality pervades the
American criminal justice system.' Interest in seeing the guilty fairly
convicted conflicts with the need for an efficient process in which
all cases are resolved permanently.' If a defendant is allowed to appeal
every possible error, stability and certainty will be removed from the
criminal justice system.' Some errors, however, lead to the convic-
tion of innocent defendants.' This author believes that avoiding this
result clearly outweighs the interest of finality.'
Errors by defense attorneys are a prime example of a situation in
which defendants might be convicted unfairly., If an attorney makes
a mistake, the unwitting defendant is held to the consequences of
that error.7 This result could lead to undeserved punishment since
an innocent man could be convicted.' In this situation, the interests
of justice should take precedence over the interests of finality.9
The conflict between justice and finality traditionally has been
accommodated by the requirement of defense attorney diligence.'" If
the attorney does not meet this requirement, the client is denied an
opportunity to proceed." This denial occasionally results in punitive
measures levied upon innocent defendants.' 2
1. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text. Courts have struggled with the problem
in an attempt to encourage proper use of remedies without imposing unfair penalties upon
petitioners whose errors should be excused. L. YAcKLE, POST CorvwcIToN REMEDIES 298 (1981).
See also U.S. v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979) (discussion of justice in comparison to
finality).
2. Yackle, supra note 1, at 298.
3. Comment, "Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice". the Supreme Court's version of the
"Truly Needy" in Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 371, 380
(1983).
4. Yackle, supra note 1, at 298; see infra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
5. Comment, supra note 3, at 380.
6. Yackle, supra note 1, at 298.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Comment, supra note 3, at 380.
10. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1181 (motion for new trial based upon newly discovered
evidence).
11. People v. Clauson, 375 Cal. App.2d 699, 704, 80 Cal. Rptr. 475, 479 (1969).
12. People v. Martinez, 36 Cal. 3d 816, 826, 685 P.2d 1203, 1209, 205 Cal. Rptr. 852,
857 (1984).
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A recent California Supreme Court case, People v. Martinez, aban-
dons the diligence requirement in some circumstances 3 in an effort
to resolve the problem of unjust punishment of innocent defendants.'
In place of diligence, the court proposed a "miscarriage of justice"
standard.' 5 Under this standard, if conviction will result in a miscar-
riage of justice because an innocent person will be punished, the lack
of diligence will be overlooked.' 6
The Martinez court characterized diligence as a procedural
requirement.' 7 Consequently, the use of the miscarriage of justice test
in that case was confined to procedural errors. 8 A substantive label,
however, also could be applied to the matter of attorney diligence.
For example, some courts define substantive law as that which creates
duties, rights, and obligations. 19 Since the diligence of the attorney
could be considered a duty or an obligation to the client, diligence
might be considered substantive.2" Another argument for the
characterization of diligence as substantive is found in the body of
rules regulating the conduct and relationship of members of society
and the state.2' Diligence concerns the conduct of those members of
society known as lawyers. 22 Whether viewed as procedural or substan-
tive, however, the key concern in this analysis is that the defendant's
constitutional right of due process cannot be abridged by attorney
error. 23 Hence, although the focus of this comment primarily con-
cerns attorney procedural errors, the miscarriage of justice analysis
also should be applied to substantive errors.
The Martinez miscarriage of justice standard needs refining to
accommodate the competing forces of justice and finality. Martinez
does not define the standard or give any guidelines to courts.24 The
13. See infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
14. Martinez, 36 Cal. 3d at 826, 685 P.2d at 1209, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. A failure to follow legitimate procedural rules that results in the loss of a remedy
often is referred to as a waiver, forfeiture, or default. J. Guttenberg, Federal Habeas Corpus,
Constitutional Rights, and Procedural Forfeitures: The Delicate Balance, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV.
617, 619, n.4 (1984).
18. Martinez, 36 Cal. 3d at 826, 685 P.2d at 1209, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
19. State v. Elmore, 155 So. 896, 898 (1934); State v. Pavelich, 279 P. 1102, 1103 (Wash.
1929).
20. Id.
21. State v. Gibson, 157 N.E.2d 475, 478 (Ind. 1959).
22. People v. Clauson, 375 Cal. App. 2d 699, 704, 80 Cal. Rptr. 475, 479 (1969).
23. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
24. Martinez, 36 Cal. 3d at 826, 685 P.2d at 1209, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
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standard should be applied in terms of the awareness of the attorney.25
If the attorney is aware of the error when made, the interest in finality
will outweigh concerns of justice.26 Applying the miscarriage of justice
standard will provide a remedy for innocent defendants.
This author first will examine the Martinez case,27 the miscarriage
of justice standard, 28 and the other errors to which the miscarriage
of justice might apply. 29 The standard will be shown to be necessary
because other remedies available to a defendant, including malpractice30
and habeas corpus actions," are inadequate. The circumstances in
which the standard should be applied will be discussed. 2
An attorney awareness test will be proposed to determine whether
a miscarriage of justice has occurred.3 3 Awareness will be defined and
compared to the analytical approach in the Martinez concurrence. 4
An analogy to a similar case in habeas corpus will be drawn.35 The
question whether the awareness of the attorney or the defendant is
the more significant will be discussed.36 Finally, a practical method
for applying the test will be suggested. To understand the basic con-
flict between attorney errors and justice, however, one first must
understand the Martinez case and the impact of the case upon existing
law.
PEOPLE V. MARTINEZ
Martinez concerned a motion for a new trial based upon newly
discovered evidence . 3  The requisite elements for such a new trial
motion 39 in California were established in 1887.40 These requirements
are as follows: (1) the evidence, and not merely the fact that the
evidence is material, must be newly discovered;4' (2) the evidence must
25. See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
26. Id.
27. See infra notes 38-56 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 79-104 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 105-53 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 154-64 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 175-88 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 189-201 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 209-17 and accompanying text.
38. People v. Martinez, 36 Cal. 3d 816, 685 P.2d 1203, 205 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1984).
39. CAL. PENAL CODE §1181(8).
40. Marinez, 36 Cal. 3d at 821, 685 P.2d at 1205, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
41. Id.
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not be merely cumulative;42 (3) the evidence will render a different
result on a retrial of the cause;43 (4) the party could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced the evidence at the trial;
44
and (5) the evidence is shown by the best evidence possible. 4 The
diligence requirement has become the subject of controversy.
Traditionally, the requirement of attorney diligence has been upheld
overwhelmingly in California and nationally. 46 The rationale for the
diligence requirement is to encourage attorneys to work vigorously
on a case from the beginning instead of relaxing their efforts and
relying upon a post trial motion.4 7 The term "diligence," however,
is relative and incapable of exact definition.4 8 The diligence of the
defense attorney in marshalling the evidence for trial must be deter-
mined in light of the particular circumstances.49
In Martinez, the defendant was convicted of second degree burglary
and moved for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence.5 0
At trial, the case of the prosecution centered on certain physical
evidence that placed the defendant at the scene of the crime.5' Follow-
ing the conviction, the defense attorney came forward with the
testimony of a key witness indicating the evidence might not have
been accurate.5 2 The trial court denied the new trial motion because
the defense attorney had made an error by not exercising the requisite
diligence.53
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE §1181(8) (defines the standard "when new evidence
is discovered material to the defendant, and which he could not, with reasonable diligence,
have discovered and produced at the trial....").
46. See, e.g., B. WrrIN, JUDGMENT AND ATTACK iN TsuAL COURT, §564, Diligence; see
also People v. Clauson, 275 Cal. App. 2d 699, 704, 80 Cal. Rptr. 475, 479 (1969); People
v. Williams, 57 Cal. 2d 263, 273, 368 P.2d 353, 359, 18 Cal. Rptr. 729, 735 (1962); People
v. Beard, 46 Cal. 2d 278, 281-82, 294 P.2d 29, 31 (1956). The one case waiving the diligence
factor is Cockrell v. State, holding that even though proper diligence had not been met, the
conviction should not stand where record discloses the innocence of the defendant. 160 S.W.
343, 345 (Tex. 1913).
47. Martinez, 36 Cal. 3d at 825, 685 P.2d at 1208, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
48. People v. Williams, 57 Cal. 2d 263, 273, 368 P.2d 353, 359, 18 Cal. Rptr. 729, 735
(1962).
49. Id.
50. Martinez, 36 Cal. 3d at 820-21, 685 P.2d at 1204-05, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 853-54; see
CAL. PENAL CODE §1181(8).
51. The evidence concerned the time a certain drill press had been painted since the palm
print of the defendant had been discovered on the press the morning of the burglary. Martinez,
36 Cal. 3d at 820-21, 685 P.2d at 1204-05, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 853-54.
52. The witness, a former foreman, testified that the press had been painted on the day
or two preceding the burglary. Id. Thus, the print could have been placed during the day before
the burglary and not necessarily the night of the crime. Id.
53. Id. at 821, 685 P.2d at 1205, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 854. The foreman was an obvious
witness the attorney should have interviewed. Id. at 824, 685 P.2d at 1207, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
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On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed the trial court
holding.54 The court held that despite the lack of diligence, a new
trial should have been granted." The holding indicated that the errors
of the defense attorney should be overlooked and the defendant given
another chance if certain requirements are met.5 6
The Martinez opinion identifies two requirements to be considered
in weighing attorney errors. First, the probability of a different result
on a retrial is paramount;5 7 if the matter were to be relitigated, the
probable verdict must be favorable to the defendant.5" Otherwise, the
attorney's mistake would be harmless error. 9 Second, a miscarriage
of justice 0 must result from the enforcement of the particular rule.6
The conviction of an innocent man is a miscarriage of justice. 62 If
both factors are met, the error should be overlooked and the defen-
dant allowed to proceed as if no mistake had occurred.63 Satisfying
these requirements, therefore, results in the waiver of the diligence
requirement." The reason for this result is that underlying the policy
of the diligence requirement is the more fundamental purpose of deter-
mining guilt or innocence. 6 Diligent presentation of a case allows
the jury to decide the truth of the matter more accurately. 66 The
diligence requirement is designed to ensure justice, but sustaining an
54. Id. at 826-7, 685 P.2d at 1209, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 825, 685 P.2d at 1208, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
57 Id.
58. Id.
59. CAL. PENAL CODE §1404.
60. This phrase is derived from the California Constitution, which states "no judgment
shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause. . . for any error as to a matter of pro-
cedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall
be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice." CAL.
CoNsT. art. VI, §13 (emphasis added). The amendment indicates the court must examine the
evidence and determine if actual injury has occurred. See People v. O'Bryan, 165 Cal. 55,65, 130 P. 1042, 1046 (1913). The phrase has been defined in one line of cases to mean a
miscarriage of justice should be declared if the court determines there is a reasonable prob-
ability that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached. People
v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243, 254 (1956). Watson is not controlling with
regard to attorney error, as the cases following Watson concern court, not attorney, error.
See, e.g., People v. Aho, 152 Cal. App. 3d 658, 662, 199 Cal. Rptr. 671, 673 (1984) (failure
to give patterned instruction); People v. Hickok, 198 Cal. App. 2d 442, 447, 17 Cal. Rptr.
875, 878 (1961) (omitted instruction); People v. Rios, 154 Cal. App. 3d 604, 637, 201 Cal.
Rptr. 448, 467 (1984) (exclusion of evidence).
61. Martinez, 36 Cal. 3d at 826, 685 P.2d at 1209, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 825, 685 P.2d at 1208, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
66. See id.
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erroneous conviction because of lack of diligence does not comport
with justice. 7 Thus, if a requirement designed to encourage justice
is in fact an impediment to the achievement of justice, the error should
be overlooked.6" Rules should not blind the system to the occasional
miscarriage of justice. 9
Martinez not only provides an exception for the diligence standard
but also poses questions about other requirements for attorney action.
The diligence element, previously required for proving the need for
a new trial, now is waived if a miscarriage of justice would result."
The question arises as to whether the Martinez holding can be applied
to other forms of attorney error, in addition to lack of diligence.
In the interests of justice, if an attorney makes a mistake, the defen-
dant should not always be penalized. 1 This equitable result rests in
the nature of the criminal justice system, which allows attorneys to
act independently of the defendants they represent. The attorney is
the manager7" of the lawsuit and often wields exclusive control over
the process of the case.73 The attorney often makes decisions and takes
actions without the knowledge of the defendant.74 Since the defen-
dant is not always informed or aware of the necessary requirements
of law, responsibility rests with the attorney to satisfy them." If an
attorney makes a mistake, however, the defendant suffers.7 6 The in-
terests of justice dictate that the unfortunate client should not be held
to the consequences of the error.77 This result can be accomplished
by extending the concern in Martinez for preventing a miscarriage
of justice to other attorney errors.78 The application of Martinez to
67. Id. at 826, 685 P.2d at 1208, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 826, 685 P.2d at 1209, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
70. This waiver of the diligence element seems to conflict with California Penal Code
§1181(8). The role of the courts, however, is to interpret laws and the Martinez court was
delineating an exception to the Penal Code. See Martinez, 36 Cal.3d 816, 825, 685 P.2d 1203,
1208, 205 Cal. Rptr. 852, 857. Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE §1181(8) (new trial motion based upon
newly discovered evidence). In addition, all other elements of §1 181(8) had been met in Martinez.
If another element had been in question, the diligence factor might not have been waived.
Martinez, 36 Cal. 3d at 825, 685 P.2d at 1208, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
71. Id. at 826, 685 P.2d at 1209, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
72. Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73, 81 (9th Cir. 1965).
73. Comment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirements of Personal Participation, Competence
and Legitimate State Interest, 54 CAL F. L. Ray. 1262, 1269 (1966).
74. Id. at 1270. The defense attorney is allocated the responsibility for making most, if
not all, of the strategic and tactical decisions concerning the trial of the client's case. Guttenberg,
supra note 17, at 707. See id. at 712 (client is not informed or advised of attorney's actions).
75. Comment, supra note 73, at 1269.
76. Martinez, 36 Cal. 3d at 825, 685 P.2d at 1208, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
77. Id. at 826, 685 P.2d at 1209, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
78. Id.
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other forms of attorney error is supported further by the lack of other
remedies for the defendant because the traditional remedies of malprac-
tice and habeas corpus are ineffective.
THE INEFFECTIVE MALPRACTICE SUIT
Criminal defendants penalized by attorney error may have a remedy
in a civil malpractice suit. 7 9 This remedy, however, usually is
unsuccessful.8 0 Many criminal defendants have sued their defense
counsel alleging lack of skill or expertise and have been denied relief."'
One reason for this denial is that courts often have raised a strong
presumption of attorney competence12 and have been hesitant to review
the performance of counsel." With few exceptions,84 criminal defense
attorneys have not been held liable to clients for mistakes in the con-
duct of the case. "5 Courts generally have refused to equate effective
assistance with flawless defense. "6 No defendant has a right to a perfect
trial. 7 Thus, a criminal defendant has great difficulty establishing a
malpractice cause of action."
The agency doctrine also provides a major rationale for the refusal
of the courts to grant relief for the errors of defense attorneys. "9 This
concept imputes the acts of the attorney, though perhaps incompe-
tent, to the client.9 ° Thus, the actions of the attorney become the
79. R. MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 586-87 (1981).
80. Id.; Guttenberg, supra note 17, at 709. One commentator suggests that the unavailability
of a malpractice suit in criminal cases results from either a reluctance to put a price on the
wrong done a client when the attorney's errors result in a conviction or from the assumption
of the court that the client got what was deserved. L. Mazor, Power and Responsibility in
the Attorney-Client Relation, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1120, 1134 (1968).
81. Mallen, supra note 79, at 585-87. The criminal attorney must possess and exercise
knowledge and skills not usually expected of the ordinary civil practitioner. The frequent lack
of skill makes legal malpractice all too common. Id.
82. Comment, supra note 73, at 1276.
83. Id. at 1277.
84. See, e.g., Morgan v. Ranson, 95 Cal. App. 3d 664, 669-70, 157 Cal. Rptr. 212, 215
(1979) (reversible error when dismissal based on failure to answer interrogatories that plaintiff
never received).
85. D. MaIsELmN, ATORNEY MALPRACTIcE: LAW AND PROCEDURE 255 (1980).
86. Comment, supra note 73, at 1277. An attorney's inexperience, lack of preparation,
unfamiliarity with procedure, and unwise advice have been held insufficient for a cause of
action. Id.
87. Id.
88. Furthermore, when a client unsuccessfully raises the issue of his attorney's alleged in-
competence by appeal or in a habeas corpus proceeding, the client may be precluded from
thereafter suing the attorney for malpractice. Meiselman, supra note 85, at 259. The client
is estopped since the matter already has been raised and answered. Id.
89. Mazor, supra note 80, at 1129.
90. Comment, supra note 73, at 1278. See also Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, 98 (6th
Cir., 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 869 (1945).
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actions of the defendant.9 This imputation creates an almost insur-
mountable barrier to recovery for a defendant in a malpractice action.9 2
Defendants cannot sue for their own mistakes. 93
In addition to the agency doctrine, the defendant as plaintiff in
a civil malpractice suit must overcome other potential barriers to
success.9" The defendant must prove actual innocence of the under-
lying criminal charge. 95 If the defendant is guilty, the guilt, not the
negligence of the attorney, may be considered the proximate cause
of the conviction. 96 Guilty defendants deserve their punishment,
regardless of attorney errors. 97 The court in such a situation will not
allow the defendant to recover. 98
The defendant also may need to overcome the barrier of collateral
estoppel,99 which may prevent a client from attacking the attorney's
performance in a malpractice claim.' A client who has unsuccessfully
raised the constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in
the underlying criminal action is estopped from raising identical issues
in a subsequent malpractice action.' 1 Thus, defendants who have
endeavored to secure relief by claiming ineffectiveness of counsel will
be denied a malpractice suit.
Another barrier to a successful malpractice suit is that errors of
judgment by the attorney probably are immune from suit for malprac-
tice liability.' 2 This immunity extends to decisions within an attorney's
professional discretion and to errors in judgment. 3 If the defense
attorney claims the mistake was part of a considered plan, no relief
will be granted. 04
The civil remedy of a professional malpractice suit generally is in-
effective due to the reluctance of the courts to review attorney effec-
91. Comment, supra note 73, at 1281-82. The agency doctrine has elicited criticism. See,
e.g., Comment, supra note 73, at 1278-87; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 114 (1977) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). The Tompsett doctrine, however, has not been overruled. See, e.g., U.S.
v. Redfield, 197 F. Supp. 559, 575 (1961).
92. Comment, supra note 73, at 1281-82.
93. Id.
94. Comment, Criminal Malpractice: Threshold Barriers to Recovery Against Negligent
Criminal Counsel, 1981 DUKE L.J. 542, 543.
95. Id. at 546.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 543.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 551.
102. Id. at 560-61.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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tiveness, the imposition of the agency doctrine and the existence of
other potential barriers. The defendant must pursue an alternate
remedy. The other traditional remedy of habeas corpus, however, also
is not adequate in all circumstances.
HABEAS CORPUS AS AN INADEQUATE REMEDY
Habeas corpus provides a general post-conviction remedy for
prisoners who are attacking their convictions on a constitutional
basis. 05 The writ of habeas corpus is a civil remedy since the civil
right of liberty is at stake. 06 The writ was placed in the United States
Constitution' 7 to secure release from illegal physical confinement.' 8
The grant of a writ, however, frustrates the interest of the state in
the finality of convictions and interferes with the coherent administra-
tion of state criminal procedure. 09 Defendants who repeatedly challenge
their decisions force the state to re-open and re-litigate cases previously
considered closed." 0 To prevent the disruption of stable judicial pro-
cedure, federal courts have imposed certain judicial limitations upon
use of the writ."'
The first of these judicial limitations is the requirement of exhaus-
tion of state remedies." 2 Prior to seeking a writ of habeas corpus,
a defendant must exhaust the direct state and federal appellate
remedies." 3 The initial question under the doctrine is whether any
state procedures are available by which the petitioner can raise the
question sought to be presented in federal court."' If an appropriate
105. Comment, Habeas Corpus-The Supreme Court Defines the Wainwright v. Sykes
"Cause" and "Prejudice" Standard, 19 \VAKE FOREST L. REv. 441 (1983).
106. Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559 (1883) (habeas corpus is remedy for enforce-
ment of civil right of personal liberty).
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, §9, cl. 2. The passage of the fourteenth amendment gave rise
to the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch 28, 4 Stat. 385. The Act
later was codified into the United States Code. 28 U.S.C. §2241 (1949). An extensive review
of habeas corpus is beyond the scope of this comment. For more information, see Yackle,
supra note 1, at 4 (1981); J. CooK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE AcCUSED 228 (1976).
108. Comment, Habeas Corpus: A Rule of Timing Evolves Into a Doctrine of Forfeiture
-the Wainwright Cause and Actual Prejudice Standard Remains Undefined-Engle v. Isaac,
26 How. L.J. 1269, 1274 (1983). The writ of habeas corpus is limited to five circumstances,
only one of which is relevant here: the defendant is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §2241(3) (1949).
109. Comment, supra note 105, at 442. See also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88-89
(1977).
110. Comment, supra note 105, at 442.
111. Id.
112. Cook, supra note 107, at 259.
113. Id. at 259-61. The exhaustion requirement may be excused by some courts when the
defendant can prove the futility of a state court attempt. Id. at 265.
114. Smith v. Sheeter, 402 F. Supp. 624, 626 (S.D. Ohio) (1975).
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state remedy is available and the defendant cannot indicate a valid
reason for a waiver of the exhaustion requirement,' the writ will
be refused." 6 Examples of reasons for waiver include imminent in-
fliction of the death penalty and petty offenses." 7
If the attorney error constitutes a state procedural default, further
limitations exist on the writ." ' In this context, the problem is that
the attorney fails to comply with state procedural rules that dictate
the method of preserving claims.' 9 If a defendant, through an attorney,
bypasses a chance to present to the state court a federal question
relevant to the power of the state to hold the defendant in custody,
further state process has been forfeited.' 20 Thus, if a state rule in-
dicates a method to preserve a constitutional claim and the defen-
dant fails to abide by that rule, the claim is lost.' 2 ' Although two
recent Supreme Court cases narrow this limitation on relief, a defen-
dant can be denied a remedy if the attorney cannot meet the new
requirements.'2
A. Fay v. Noia
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court modified the treatment
of procedural forfeitures that previously had been applied under
the requirement of state remedy exhaustion.' 23 In Fay v. Noia,24
the Court narrowed the scope of the exhaustion requirement.' 25
The Court recognized that in some cases the conduct of the applicant
may make the relief sought unavailable.' 26 Discretion to deny relief
was limited to circumstances in which a petitioner had deliberately
bypassed the orderly procedure of the state courts. 2 The Court
indicated that the limitation provided by the Noia rule was intended
to prevent the manipulation or abuse of post-conviction remedies
115. For a list of possible reasons, see Cook, supra note 107, at 272-73.
116. Ex parte Royall, 116 U.S. 252, 255 (1886); Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101, 105
(1898); Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 405 (1959).
117. Cook, supra note 107, at 272-73.
118. Guttenberg, supra note 17, at 619.
119. Id.
120. Comment, supra note 105, at 442.
121. Id.
122. Wainwright, 433 U.S. 72 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
123. Guttenberg, supra note 17, at 620.
124. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
125. See 372 U.S. at 429-38; Guttenberg, supra note 17, at 620.
126. 372 U.S. at 438.
127. Id. See infra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
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by petitioners.' An applicant for a writ, therefore, might be denied
relief only if court procedures were bypassed deliberately. 2 9 The
deliberate bypass standard later was dismantled by the Court.130
B. Wainwright v. Sykes
In the second significant case regarding state procedural defects,
Wainwright v. Sykes,' 3 ' the Court discredited the Noia rule. 32 The
Court rejected the sweeping language of Noia because the rule would
encourage manipulation on the part of defense lawyers. 33 Some at-
torneys would take their chances on a verdict of guilty in the state
court with the intent to raise constitutional claims later. 34 In place
of the deliberate bypass standard, the Court substituted a cause and
prejudice test. 3 As explained above, a prisoner typically is ineligible
for habeas corpus relief if the state procedural default bars the asser-
tion of the claim on appeal. 36 An exception to this rule is made if
the petitioner can demonstrate cause for procedural default and pre-
judice arising from the constitutional defect. 37 The Court emphasized
this rule would prevent a miscarriage of justice by allowing the federal
constitutional claim of a person who deserves relief.' 38 The Court left
undefined the meaning of cause and prejudice, but the terms have
been clarified substantially by two later cases. 139
Cause, as defined in Engle v. Isaac,4 ' means that the defendant
must bear the cost of counsel error provided the error does not
establish a valid sixth amendment claim.' 4 ' If the error does not con-
stitute a sixth amendment violation, the cause element will be met.' 42
In addition, cause is not satisfied by unawareness of a constitutional
claim. 1 3 In other words, ignorance is no defense to a failure to raise
128. Yackle, supra note 1, at 309.
129. 372 U.S. at 438.
130. Guttenberg, supra note 17, at 621.
131. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1963).
132. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 89; Guttenberg, supra note 17, at 621. The Court underwent
a significant change in personnel and philosophies. Id.
133. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 89.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 87, citing Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
136. Comment, supra note 105, at 443.
137. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87; Comment, supra note 105, at 443.
138. 433 U.S. at 90-91.
139. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); U.S. v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
140. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
141. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 134; W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, 3 CRIMNAL PROCEDURE 349 (1984).
142. Id.
143. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 134. The Court also indicated that the futility of raising a claim
will not suffice to permit a defendant to withhold the constitutional claim. Id. at 130.
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a constitutional claim in compliance with a state procedural rule. 44
Prejudice was defined in United States v. Frady141 as requiring the
defendant to demonstrate that the alleged errors work to the actual
and substantial disadvantage of the defendant.' 46 The petitioner must
bring forth affirmative evidence of a wrongful conviction.' 7 The pre-
judice must be shown to have affected the entire trial with errors
of constitutional dimension.' 4 1 If a defendant cannot meet the cause
and prejudice test, habeas corpus relief will be denied. 41
Thus, the remedy provided by habeas corpus is limited by the re-
quirement of exhaustion of state remedies.' 50 If the error is procedural,
the remedy is limited further by a need to demonstrate cause and
prejudice.' 5' Due to these limitations, innocent defendants might be
barred from justice. Defendants who cannot secure relief through
habeas corpus or a civil malpractice suit need the remedy provided
by a miscarriage of justice standard. The situations in which the stan-
dard would be applied arise in two general areas.
TYPES OF ATTORNEY ERRORS
Attorney errors can be divided into two broad categories. In this
regard, the major concern is to distinguish between those errors of
a constitutional dimension'52 and those that are merely technical.' 3
Those errors with constitutional implications are subsumed under the
doctrine of habeas corpus. 54 The need for a Martinez remedy arises
when the defendant cannot satisfy the habeas corpus requirements.'
Some mistakes, however, are not based upon the Constitution; 56
rather, they are administrative in nature. 57 An example is a time limit
144. Id. at 134.
145. 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
146. Id. at 168.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87.
150. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
151. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87.
152. See supra notes 105-62 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 105-49 and accompanying text.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 455, 499 P.2d 489, 493, 103 Cal. Rptr.
233, 237, cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1972) (indicating the right to waive a constitutional pro-
tection is not a right of constitutional dimensions); U.S. v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783-84
(1979).
157. The failure of a trial court to ask a defendant represented by an attorney whether
he has anything to say before sentence is imposed is not an error of the character or magnitude
necessary for a writ of habeas corpus. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27 (1939). The error
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for filing papers or court appearances; the Constitution does not in-
dicate specific temporal restraints.' 5 The remedy provided by habeas
corpus is not available for failure to meet these time limits but the
defendant still may be injured by attorney error." 9 Since an error
of this type normally would prevent the defendant from gaining relief,
the "miscarriage of justice" test provided by Martinez fulfills the in-
terests of justice.' ° If a miscarriage of justice would result from en-
forcement of the rule, Martinez indicates that the rule should be
waived.' This standard also would apply to those defendants who
could not meet the habeas corpus criteria.' 6 An analysis of the miscar-
riage of justice standard, undefined by the Martinez court,
demonstrates a need for refinement and limitation.
The miscarriage of justice standard needs to be defined because
the phrase alone does not provide guidance to courts. The standard
is ambiguous and leaves judges to create definitions. 6 3 The uncer-
tainty caused by different interpretations would seriously impair the
finality component in the dichotomy between finality and justice. 64
Some courts would define the standard very broadly and give the
defendant every possible opportunity to correct errors. 16 These repeated
attempts would be contrary to the interest of finality, 66 as cases need
to be resolved permanently.' 67 Thus, to avoid the abuse of the miscar-
riage of justice standard caused by differing definitions, a limitation
should be created. An awareness test is the most effective means of
limitation.
MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE DEFINED: AwARENEss
The awareness of the defense attorney is the fairest basis for a stan-
dard of review. A tactical and deliberate decision1 6 not to follow
is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional and is not a fundamental defect that inherently results
in a complete miscarriage of justice. Id. The omission is not inconsistent with the rudimentary
demands of fair procedure. Id.
158. See, e.g., CAL. RULEs oF CT. §841 (application for change of venue to be filed at
least 10 days before trial date).
159. Martinez, 36 Cal. 3d at 826, 685 P.2d at 1209, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
160. Id. at 826, 685 P.2d at 1209-10, 205 Cal. Rptr at 857-58.
161. Id.
162. See supra notes 105-49 and accompanying text.
163. Martinez, 36 Cal. 3d at 826, 685 P.2d at 1209, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
164. U.S. v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979) (discussion of miscarriage of justice in
comparison to finality).
165. See generally Yackle, supra note 1, at 298 (courts have struggled with the problem
of defense errors).
166. U.S. v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979).
167. Id.
168. For example, trial counsel, though aware of the diligence requirement, for legitimate
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rules does not deserve a waiver of those rules.' 69 The attorney merely
is attempting to secure a second chance upon appeal.' Counsel should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to secure acquittal unless
the interests of justice outweigh the demands of finality."'7 If counsel
knows of this error at the time the error is committed, the interest
in finality takes precedence over the interests of justice.1 2 Since this
author proposes an awareness standard as the appropriate means to
analyze attorney errors, a workable conceptual framework must be
established.
"Awareness" is defined as knowledge of the surrounding factual
circumstances. 73 Comparing the abstract nature of this term to other
suggested standards will be helpful as a guide to understanding the
legal concept of awareness. First, awareness will be compared to the
"true oversight" test of the Martinez concurrence. 7"
According to the Martinez concurrence, "true oversight"'" by the
defense attorney should be the determining factor in deciding whether
the defendant should be held to the mistake.'76 This factor evidences
a concern for distinguishing those errors made inadvertently and those
tactical reasons may decide not to seek a person's testimony. Martinez, 36 Cal. 3d at 828,
685 P.2d at 1210, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 859 (Grodin, J. concurring).
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., id.; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977) ("sandbagging"
laivyers take their chances on a verdict of not guilty in a state trial court with the intent to
raise their client's constitutional claims later in a federal habeas corpus action if their initial
gamble does not pay off). Martinez indicates, however, that tactical decisions should not be
given a second chance. 36 Cal. 3d at 828, 685 P.2d at 1210, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 859. One com-
mentator states that sandbagging might be justified if the evidence of guilt is overwhelming
or if greater relief may be obtained by waiting until after the conviction. See Guttenberg, supra
note 17, at 695. Otherwise, a competent defense attorney is unlikely to gamble on a later success.
Id.
171. See U.S. v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979) (discussion of miscarriage of justice
in comparison to finality).
172. Finality indicates that "a line must be drawn somewhere;" the absence of finality
frustrates deterrence. Comment, supra note 3, at 380. Cf. Martinez, 36 Cal. 3d at 828, 685
P.2d at 1210, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 859 (tactical errors not given a second chance). A luckless
defendant might have a case for ineffectiveness of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 104
S. Ct. 2052, reh. den., 104 S. Ct. 3562 (1984). See also Evitts v. Lucey, 105 S. Ct. 830, 836
(1985) (failure to file proper form is ineffective assistance of counsel). The Martinez court
specifically refused to consider the ineffective counsel theory on the basis that attorneys should
not have to plead incompetence. Martinez, 36 Cal. 3d at 826, 685 P.2d at 1208, 205 Cal.
Rptr. 857.
173. Isaacs v. U.S., 283 F.2d 587, 590 (1960).
174. 35 Cal. 3d at 828, 685 P.2d at 1210, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
175. Oversight is defined as failure to see or notice; an intentional, careless mistake or
omission. WVEBsTER's NEw TwairnmTH CENTURY DICTIoNARY UNABRIDGED 1277 (2nd ed. 1979).
See also Rath v. Sholty, 199 N.W. 2d 333, 336 (1972) (something overlooked; an omission
or error due to inadvertence (lack of attentiveness)).
176. Martinez, 36 Cal. 3d at 828, 685 P.2d at 1210, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
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carefully selected as a tactical plan.' Under this analytical approach,
the error must be inadvertent.'" No amount of deliberation on the
part of the attorney is allowed; counsel must be totally unaware of
the mistake.' 79 Thus, the concurring opinion in Martinez states that
a miscarriage of justice exists when a defendant is harmed by an error
made by an unaware attorney.'80 The state of being unaware, as the
corollary to awareness, should be compared to oversight as an aid
to analysis.
Unawareness provides a better conceptual framework than over-
sight because the former term is more inclusive. Unawareness' 8 ' in-
volves a greater degree of mental obliviousness than oversight.' 82 Being
unaware can entail a total lack of consciousness, while oversight means
having been conscious of something at a previous time and now
overlooking it. '83 While oversight thus is limited to the "forgotten"
sense, unawareness concerns both loss of memory and no consciousness
at all. Both forgetting and never knowing need to be recognized by
the awareness standard, which allows for any errors not made
tactically.'8 4 Unawareness would entail forgotten rules and points of
which one never was cognizant. Since the definition of awareness in-
cludes unawareness as a corollary, the awareness standard would seem
to be more inclusive and more appropriate than the oversight stan-
dard for defining the miscarriage of justice. The awareness standard
also must be compared to the Noia deliberate bypass standard.
The "deliberate bypass" standard was equated by the Noia Court
to the Johnson v. Zerbst'"s concept of waiver, an intentional relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' 6 The peti-
tioner thus must make a considered decision to forfeit constitutional
rights before the Court will consider those rights bypassed. 87 The
underlying premise of the Noia case is that an accused should not
suffer forfeiture of rights simply because of the inadvertence or
177. Id. The defendant must be denied relief if the record shows counsel's omissions resulted
from an informed tactical choice. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. "Unaware" is defined as not aware or conscious; without thought. vEBsTaR's NEw
TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTiONARY UNABRIDGED 1989 (2d. ed. 1979).
182. Compare "oversight" supra, note 175, with "unaware" supra, note 181.
183. Id.
184. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
185. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
186. Noia, 372 U.S. at 439; Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.
187. 372 U.S. at 439.
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negligence of counsel.' Rather, the waiver must be a personal deci-
sion based upon an understanding of the possible consequences. 6 9
This standard of deliberate bypass and the purpose of the Noia
decision are closely analogous to the miscarriage of justice standard. 9 '
Although the Court in Noia considered the awareness of the defen-
dant, not the counsel, to be paramount, avoiding abuse of the criminal
justice system through tactical decisions to avoid procedural re-
quirements is still the primary concern.' 9' The deliberate bypass stan-
dard is similar to the awareness standard in the necessary degree of
consciousness. 92 Awareness is required before an issue can be bypassed
and is an element of deliberation. 93 Since "deliberate" is equated
to the Zerbst standard regarding waiver and awareness can be equated
to deliberation, a logical conclusion is that awareness also is related
to the Zerbst test. 94
Generally, however, awareness would seem a better standard for
miscarriage of justice than the Zerbst standard. Awareness appears
to be a more basic and fundamental aspect of the miscarriage of justice
than the Zerbst concept of waiver. One must be aware before one
can have an intent to waive a right. 195 Awareness, however, can be
related closely to the Zerbst standard since awareness is part of know-
ing and of intent. 196 The Zerbst test is understood and quoted univer-
sally and might serve as a definition or explanation of awareness on
a practical level for attorneys who prefer a familiar guidepost. Thus,
awareness has been demonstrated to be a more effective way to define
the miscarriage of justice than either oversight, deliberateness, or the
Zerbst waiver. Moreover, the standard should apply to the defense
attorney rather than to the defendant.
The primary reason the awareness of the defense attorney is more
appropriate for a miscarriage of justice standard lies in the reality
188. Id.
189. Comment, supra note 3, at 384. The Supreme Court has indicated that proper advice
is necessary for a voluntary relinquishment. Kercheval v. U.S., 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
190. Compare Noia, 372 U.S. at 439, with Martinez, 36 Cal. 3d at 826, 685 P.2d at 1209,
205 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
191. Id.
192. "Aware" is defined as knowing; cognizant; informed; conscious. WEmSm's NExv TwEa-
TETI CENTURY DicTioNARY UNABRIDGED 131 (2nd ed. 1979). "Deliberate" means carefully
thought out or formed. Id. at 1277.
193. One must be aware of something before one can think carefully. See supra note 192.
194. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
195. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
196. Daniels v. Berry, 146 S.E. 420, 425 (S.C. 1929) (aware defined as presupposing or
requiring actual knowledge).
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of the criminal justice system. As discussed above, an attorney func-
tions independently of the defendant.' 9 7 An attorney has no need to
inform the defendant of many routine decisions or requirements.' 98
Time pressures often do not permit the attorney to discuss all re-
quirements with a client, which makes informing clients impractical. 99
Thus, defendant's awareness realistically cannot be the standard for
the miscarriage of justice. The person directly responsible, the attorney,
is the appropriate subject to be aware.
An argument can be made that the innocent defendant still is
injured by the error of the attorney, even if the error* is deliberate
and not subject to the miscarriage of justice standard of relief.200
Although harsh, the interests of finality seem to outweigh the in-
justice in this situation. 2 1 The defense attorney, however unskilled,
is an agent of the defendant. 20 2 Defendants cannot always be allowed
a second bite at the apple. 20 3 Hence the miscarriage of justice standard
must be defined by attorney awareness. A possible method of apply-
ing the miscarriage of justice standard is suggested in the Martinez
opinion.
First, the Martinez court appeared to indicate that this standard
is to be applied only to cases in which no other solution is possible
20 4
and the result would be the conviction of an innocent defendant.
20 5
The California Supreme Court characterizes the conviction of an in-
nocent person as "unthinkable. ' 2 6 The court apparently is willing
to waive attorney errors if to do so is the only method available to
ensure justice.20 7 Thus, part of the miscarriage of justice is that no
other solution exists.20 8 Once necessity is established, defense counsel
would submit a declaration stating the circumstances of the error with
197. Comment, supra note 73, at 1269; see infra notes 72-4 and accompanying text; see
also Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 93 (day to day conduct of defense rests with attorney; respon-
sibility for some decisions must rest with attorney and be made, as a practical matter, without
consulting the client).
198. Comment, supra note 73, at 1269-70.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 57 Cal. 2d 263, 275, 368 P.2d 353, 360, 18 Cal. Rptr.
729, 736 (1962) (conviction of innocent man is unthinkable).
201. Comment, supra note 3, at 384.
202. Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, 98 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 869 (1945);
see also Evitts v. Lucey, 105 S. Ct. 830, 844 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
203. Martinez, 36 Cal. 3d at 828, 685 P.2d at 1210, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
204. Id. at 826, 685 P.2d at 1209, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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particularity.0 9 This declaration would include the fact that the attorney
was unaware.2"' The district attorney then would respond with evidence
and argument that the failure stemmed from a competent tactical
decision. 2" The adversary system would ensure the accuracy of the
declaration. 21 2 This method provides a practical system of incorporating
the awareness of an attorney into the miscarriage of justice standard
and using the standard in court.
CONCLUSION
Competition between the forces of justice and finality is clearly
demonstrated in the case of attorney errors. Interests of justice dic-
tate that innocent defendants should not be punished for their at-
torney's mistakes. Yet, concerns of finality need to be recognized to
provide stability and certainty in the criminal justice system. This
dilemma is resolved by the Martinez case, which allows innocent defen-
dants relief from attorney errors if a miscarriage of justice would
result from conviction of an innocent defendant. This author has pro-
posed an attorney awareness test to define the miscarriage of justice
standard. This test is met if the defense attorney is unaware of the
error made.
The miscarriage of justice standard is necessary because other tradi-
tional remedies of a defendant, malpractice or habeas corpus, are in-
adequate. Awareness has been shown to be a better, though analogous,
test of miscarriage of justice than the Zerbst standard of knowing
and intelligent waiver or the "true oversight" test of the Martinez
concurrence. A practical method of using the miscarriage of justice
standard has been suggested based upon necessity and the adversary
system. Thus the conflict between the court's need to provide justice
and an efficient criminal justice system can be met by emphasizing
the mental requirement of the attorney's awareness.
Kristen Hegge
209. Id. at 828, 685 P.2d at 1210, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
